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Does Anyone Get Stopped at the Gate?  An Empirical Assessment of the Daubert Trilogy in the 
States 
 
Eric Helland* 
Jonathan Klick** 
 
Abstract:  The Supreme Court’s trilogy of evidence cases, Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire 
appear to mark a significant departure in the way scientific and expert evidence is handled in 
federal court.  By focusing on the underlying methods used to generate the experts’ conclusions, 
Daubert has the potential to impose a more rigorous standard on experts.  Given this potential, 
some individuals have called for states to adopt the Daubert standards to purge “junk science” 
from state courts.  However, there is relatively little empirical support for the notion that Daubert 
affects the quality of expert evidence.  Using a large dataset of state court litigation, we examine 
whether state adoption of the Daubert standards has a systematic effect on the observable 
characteristics of experts retained in civil cases.  We find very little evidence in support of a 
significant Daubert effect.  This is true even when we do a more detailed analysis of experts in 
products liability cases, an area of particular concern in the expert evidence debate.  These 
results suggest that, at the state level at least, adoption of the Daubert standards has not led to 
increasing rigor in expert testimony. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Daubert1 and its progeny, Joiner2 and Kumho Tire,3 appear to drastically change the way 
federal courts deal with scientific and, ultimately, all expert witness evidence.  Moving away 
from the traditional Frye4 test which focuses on whether the expert’s testimony is generally 
accepted in the relevant scientific community,5 Daubert interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 
702’s reliability standard as requiring methodological soundness or rigor6 rather than scientific 
consensus.  By charging federal judges with this inquiry into the methods underlying the expert’s 
claims, Daubert places those judges as gatekeepers with wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony.7 
 
 While the Court itself implied that the Daubert standard was more liberal than Frye’s 
general acceptance test, noting that the Frye test was “rigid” and runs against the general thrust 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence toward reducing barriers to opinion testimony,8 most 
commentators now believe that Daubert is a more demanding standard.9  Given the central role 
of expert evidence in modern civil litigation, it is not surprising that supporters of the tort reform 
movement began to push for the adoption of Daubert at the state court level,10 while pro-plaintiff 
advocacy groups argued against state adoption.11 
 
 Despite conventional legal wisdom and the efforts of advocacy groups, however, there is 
very little evidence regarding the causal effects of state adoption of the Daubert trilogy.  Even at 
the federal level, it is not generally possible to draw causal inferences regarding Daubert as 
distinct from a general trend toward skepticism of expert evidence.12 
                                                 
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
2 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
3 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
4 Frye vs. United States, 293 F. 1013 (DC Cir 1923). 
5 Ibid, 1014. 
6 Daubert, 580. 
7 Joiner, 137, clarified this point regarding judicial latitude in the gatekeeping function. 
8 Daubert, 579. 
9 See Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 
91 VALR 471, 472 (2005).  For empirical evidence consistent with this belief, see Lloyd Dixon and Brian Gill, 
Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision xv 
(2001). 
10 See, for example, American Tort Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellholes, 34 (2007) available at 
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf (last visited on November 19, 2008). 
11 See, for example, Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy, Daubert: The Most Influential Supreme 
Court Ruling You’ve Never Heard Of (2003) available at http://www.defendingscience.org/upload/Daubert-The-
Most-Influential-Supreme-Court-Decision-You-ve-Never-Heard-Of-2003.pdf  (last visited on November 19, 2008). 
12 Note that concerns over “junk science” pre-date the 1993 Daubert decision.  For example, a 1985 Department of 
Justice report criticizes the trend toward using “junk science” to demonstrate the causation element in tort suits, 
Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the causes, extent and policy implications of the current crisis in 
insurance availability and affordability (1986). ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED274437.  Also, Peter 
 In this article we present the first systematic analysis of the effects of state adoption of 
each of the three parts of the Daubert trilogy using a large representative dataset of trials across 
different case types.  Specifically, we look at whether experts from various disciplines are 
introduced in the disputes as well as objective qualifications of the experts who are introduced as 
they relate to the state evidence rules.  We find very little evidence that state adoption matters 
along either dimension.  To provide a more complete picture of the effect of expert evidence 
rules in the products liability context, an area of particular concern to commentators and 
activists, we collect more detailed information on the experts offered in these disputes, again 
finding that adoption of the Daubert standards is of little consequence.  While we are not able to  
determine whether these non-effects are due to inconsistent application of the Daubert standards 
at the state level or because Daubert itself is inconsequential relative to more general trends 
toward demanding greater rigor from experts regardless of the formal rule, our results do suggest 
that claims about the importance of Daubert are overblown. 
 
 The article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background information regarding 
the Daubert trilogy; section 3 discusses the patterns of adoption of the federal standards in state 
courts; section 4 describes our data source and statistical identification strategy with results, 
including the products liability specific analysis, presented in section 5.  After outlining the 
shortcomings of our study in section 6, we conclude. 
 
2. The Daubert Trilogy 
 
 Prior to 1993, federal courts applied a test of “general acceptance” to determine whether 
to admit scientific evidence as directed by the holding of Frye v. United States.13  Under this test, 
courts simply asked whether the evidence represented the consensus view of the relevant 
scientific community or literature.  However, in Daubert, the Court unanimously decided that 
Frye was no longer the standard for admissibility under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
 
 Noting that Frye was not mentioned in the drafting history of Rule 702, the Court 
declared the general acceptance rule to be too rigid.14 However, the Court did not interpret Rule 
702 as eliminating all constraints on admissibility of expert evidence.  Instead, the Court stated 
that trial judges must ensure that expert evidence is both relevant and reliable according to Rule 
702.15   
                                                                                                                                                             
Huber’s Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science In The Courtroom (1991) brought popular attention to the supposed 
problem. 
13 Frye vs. United States, 293 F. 1013 (DC Cir 1923). 
14 Daubert, 588. 
15 Ibid, 589. 
In determining reliability, the Court focuses on a Popperian view that defines science as 
the generation and testing of falsifiable hypotheses.16  To guide trial judges, the Court lays out a 
number of criteria for determining reliability all of which relate to this underlying view of what 
constitutes science, namely rigorous empirical methods.  Among the elements a trial court should 
consider when determining whether to admit scientific evidence are peer review and publication, 
which the Court notes increases the likelihood that methodological flaws will be discovered.17  
The Court also directs trial judges to consider the underlying method’s error rate and fidelity to 
established methodological standards.  Lastly, the Court does suggest that acceptance within the 
relevant scientific community can be considered in the admissibility decision, though it is not a 
sufficient condition for admissibility.18  Above all, the Court stresses that the trial judge’s 
analysis is a flexible one that must focus on methodological rigor and soundness of the 
underlying evidence to determine its reliability.19 
 
Perhaps because of the Court’s seemingly inconsistent aspirations for both a preference to 
remove barriers to the admissibility of expert evidence20 and for methodological rigor21, 
questions arose as to whether the Daubert standard applied symmetrically to both the admission 
and exclusion of evidence, as well as in regard to what degree of latitude a trial judge has in 
questioning the connection between an expert’s conclusion and the underlying method used to 
reach that conclusion.  These questions were largely answered in Joiner which held that the 
Daubert standard applies symmetrically in decisions to both allow and exclude expert 
evidence.22  Further, the Court stated that the trial judge in Joiner was operating within his 
gatekeeper capacity when he ruled that the experts in Joiner were merely speculating when they 
extrapolated the results of methodologically sound animal studies to support their conclusions 
regarding the effects of PCBs on the development of cancer in humans.23  The decision in Joiner 
affirmed that the Daubert standard provides trial judges with wide latitude in making 
admissibility based on their own evaluation of the reliability of the underlying methods used to 
reach a scientific conclusion and their connection to the facts of the case before them. 
 
The last part of the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire, clarified the domain of the Daubert 
analysis.  Namely, in Kumho Tire, the Court makes it clear that a trial judge’s focus on 
methodological rigor is not restricted to scientific evidence, but includes all expert evidence.24  
However, the Court does make it clear that the specific criteria laid out in Daubert are only 
                                                 
16 Ibid, 593. 
17 However, the Court does note that publication and peer review work against innovative, though methodologically 
sound work, leading it to suggest that publication and peer review are informative but not necessary conditions for 
admitting evidence. 
18 Ibid, 594. 
19 Ibid, 595. 
20 Ibid, 588. 
21 Ibid, 595. 
22 Joiner, 517. 
23 Joiner, 518. 
24 Kumho Tire, 147. 
illustrative, not necessary preconditions for admissibility, noting that some may not be relevant 
in certain fields of expertise.25  That is, Daubert directs trial judges to focus on methodological 
soundness in their gatekeeping role, but it does not provide a cookbook approach to the 
admissibility inquiry. 
 
3. Adoption of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire in the States 
 
 Within three months of the Court’s adoption of the Daubert standards,26 New Mexico 
embraced the standards27 and three other states followed suit by the end of that year.28  By 2005, 
nearly half of the states had adopted Daubert as the framework for determining the admissibility 
of expert evidence, and many of those went on to adopt the positions taken in Joiner and Kumho 
Tire.  Using the work of David Bernstein and Jeffrey Jackson29 as our starting point, we code the 
date of adoption of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire by each state as well as provide some 
indication of the state’s pre-1993 expert evidence rule.  Table 1 provides the details of this 
analysis. 
 
Table 1: 
Year of Adoption of Daubert Trilogy in the States 
State Pre-1993 Standard Daubert Joiner Kumho Tire Relevant Cites 
Alabama Frye 2002 (limited 
application) 
  586 So.2d 242, 
247; 
Ala. Code 36-18-
30; 
842 So.2d 689, 
690 
 
Alaska Frye 1999 1999  718 P.2d 129; 
974. P.2d 386; 
110 P.3d 982 
 
Arizona Frye    780 S.W.2d 581 
 
Arkansas Relevancy 
Approach 
2000 2003 2003 20 S.W.2d 429; 
14 S.W.3d 512; 
100 S.W.3d 715 
 
California Frye    130 Cal. Rptr. 
144; 
 
Colorado “Sufficiently 
Advanced” 
   637 P.2d 354; 
22 P.3d 68,77 
 
Connecticut Frye 1997 2001  534 A.2d 877; 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 151. 
26 June 28, 1993 
27 August 30, 1993 
28 Vermont (November 29, 1993), Louisiana (November 30, 1993), and West Virginia (December 13, 1993). 
29 David Bernstein and Jeffrey Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMJ 351 (2004). 
698 A.2d 739 
 
Delaware DE Rules of 
Evidence 
1999 1999 1999 510 A.2d 488; 
737 A.2d 513 
 
Florida Frye    471 So.2d 9 
 
Georgia “Admissible if 
jurors couldn’t 
reach conclusion 
on their own” 
2005 2005 2005 277 S.E.2d 678; 
2005 GA Laws 
Act 1 (S.B. 3) 
 
 
Hawaii Modified Test 
Including Frye 
 2001 2001 645 P.2d 1330; 
19 P.3d 42, 56-57 
 
Idaho Totality of 
Circumstances 
   682 P.2d 571 
 
 
Illinois Frye    88 Ill.2d 225, 241 
 
Indiana Frye Helpful but not 
binding 
  833 N.E.2d 93; 
Ind R E 702 
 
Iowa Ad Hoc  1999  297 N.W.2d 80; 
590 N.W.2d 525 
 
Kansas Frye    895 P.2d 1238 
 
Kentucky Frye Equivalent 1995 2000 2000 777 S.W.2d 930; 
908 S.W.2d 100; 
11 S.W.3d 575 
 
Louisiana Balancing Test 1993 2001 2000 368 So.2d 975; 
628 So.2d 1116; 
774 So.2d 1022; 
793 So.2d 336 
 
Maine Relevance and 
Qualifications of 
Expert 
   388 A.2d 500, 
503 
 
 
Maryland Frye    391 A.2d 364 
 
Massachusetts Daubert-like 1994 2000 2000 641 N.E.2d 1342; 
733 N.E.2d 1042 
 
Michigan Court as 
Gatekeeper; Frye 
in 1999 
   443 N.W.2d 340; 
607 N.W.2d 123 
 
 
Minnesota Frye    459 N.W.2d 332 
 
Mississippi Frye 2003 2003 2003 612 So.2d 381; 
Miss. R Evid. 
702 
 
Missouri Frye until 1997    700 S.W.2d 823; 
936 S.W.2d 797 
 
Montana Trial Judge 
Discretion 
1994 1996  Barmmeyer v. 
Mont. Power Co; 
885 P.2d 457; 
909 P.2d 1171 
 
Nebraska Frye 2001 2001 2001 457 N.W.2d 405; 
631 N.W.2d 862 
 
Nevada Trustworthy    765 P.2d 1147 
 
New Hampshire Trial Judge 
Discretion 
2002  2002 574 A.2d 934; 
813 A.2d 409; 
814 A.2d 159 
 
New Jersey Frye Equivalent    478 A.2d 364 
 
New Mexico Trial Judge 
Discretion 
1993   671 P.2d 640; 
861 P.2d 192 
 
New York Frye    552 N.Y.S.2d 
883 
 
North Carolina Reliability    393 S.E.2d 847 
 
North Dakota Trial Judge 
Discretion 
   460 N.W.2d 400 
 
 
Ohio Trial Judge 
Discretion 
1998 1998 1999 446 N.E.2d 444; 
694 N.E.2d 1332; 
714 N.E.2d 426 
 
Oklahoma Reliability 2003 2003 2003 687 P.2d 106, 
115; 
65 P.3d 591 
 
Oregon Assistance to the 
Jury 
   639 P.2d 1264 
 
 
Pennsylvania Frye    436 A.2d 170 
 
Rhode Island Frye 2001 1999 2001 545 A.2d 1014; 
729 A.2d 677; 
772 A.2d 1056 
 
South Carolina Four Factor Test    392 S.E.2d 781 
 
South Dakota Frye 1994 2000 2000 429 N.W.2d 26; 
512 N.W.2d 482; 
609 N.W.2d 456 
 
Tennessee Multi-Factor  2002 2002 955 S.W.2d 
257,265 
78 S.W.3d 817 
 
Texas Trial Judge 
Discretion 
1995 1998 1999 923 S.W.2d 549; 
88 S.W.3d 623 
 
Utah Inherent 
Reliability 
   775 P.2d 388 
 
 
Vermont Reasonable 
Assistance 
1993  2004 264 A.2d 779; 
643 A.2d 226; 
862 A.2d 269 
 
Virginia Similar to Daubert    393 S.E.2d 609, 
621 
 
Washington Frye    755 P.2d 806 
 
West Virginia Rule 702 1993   443 S.E.2d 196 
 
Wisconsin Relevance    351 N.W.2d 469 
 
Wyoming Relevance and 
Helpfulness 
1999 2002 1999 Wyo. R. E. 702; 
859 P.2d 85; 
984 P.2d 467; 
60 P.3d 151 
 
Source:  David Bernstein and Jeffrey Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMJ 351 (2004) as well as 
authors’ search of Westlaw/Lexis case databases 
 
 As discussed at the outset, both sides of the more general tort reform debate became 
invested in the question of whether or not state courts should follow the federal approach.  As 
noted by Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon, although both sides of the tort reform debate initially 
viewed Daubert as favoring their cause, the conventional wisdom quickly converged to the view 
that Daubert is pro-defendant because it induces judges to scrutinize plaintiffs’ claims more 
closely.30  Because of this, each side mounted efforts at the state level to either encourage (pro-
defendant groups) or discourage (pro-plaintiff groups) adoption.31  Despite this conventional 
wisdom, however, there is relatively little evidence of the causal effects of adopting Daubert, 
Joiner, and/or Kumho Tire at the state level on various litigation metrics.   
 
There is some evidence that judicial scrutiny increased at the federal level after Daubert’s 
adoption.  A 2001 RAND study examined how judges handled expert opinions in 399 federal 
district court cases between January 1980 and June 1999, focusing on whether the judge 
addressed the issue of the evidence’s reliability and whether the evidence was found to be 
                                                 
30 Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 
VALR 471, 471 (and cites therein) (2005). 
31 See notes infra. 
unreliable conditional on addressing the issue.32  While the study does conclude that federal 
district court judges were more likely to scrutinize the reliability of expert evidence after 
Daubert,33 there were important fluctuations in that trend.  Namely, while the likelihood of a 
judge examining the reliability of an expert’s testimony rose to 80 percent by the July 1995-June 
1996 period, as opposed to just under 70 percent during the two years before Daubert, the same 
figure had previously been at 80 percent for the period of January 1980 to June 1989.34  
Comparable patterns were found for the likelihood that a judge would find the evidence to fail 
the reliability criteria.35  Lastly, this pattern of increasing scrutiny appears to have peaked by 
June 1997 (90 percent of evidence subjected to a reliability analysis), exhibiting a decline in the 
last two years of the RAND data (July 1997-June 1999).36  In separate analyses by case type, the 
RAND researchers found that reliability scrutiny actually declined slightly for product liability 
and toxic tort cases in the two year period directly following Daubert although it increased in 
subsequent periods.37  
  
The RAND study finds slightly stronger support for the proposition that Daubert induced 
judges to scrutinize the relevance of an expert’s testimony more closely.  In the dataset, the 
RAND researchers find an unbroken upward trend in the likelihood that a judge addresses the 
issue of relevance with respect to expert evidence during the six years following Daubert.  
However, the likelihood that evidence is found to be unreliable exhibits significant variation with 
a rate at the end of the sample (July 1997-June 1999) that is virtually identical to that found at 
the beginning of the sample (January 1980-June 1989).38 
 
 The variability of these findings is puzzling in light of the conventional wisdom that 
Daubert led to stricter scrutiny.  Perhaps, the very nature of statistical analyses makes it difficult 
to isolate subtle changes that are observed by participants in the underlying litigation such as 
attorneys and judges.  Perhaps parties, induced by stricter scrutiny, find better experts, and this 
effect does not show up in trends regarding how frequently judges scrutinize testimony.  That is, 
even though judges are not explicitly addressing reliability and relevance much more post-
Daubert, the fact that they are addressing it at comparable rates on a set of more qualified experts 
could imply that the system is more rigorous post-Daubert.  This does not seem to be borne out 
in the data.  The RAND study finds that the likelihood of an expert being found to be unqualified 
remains basically constant throughout the sample,39 as does the likelihood a given expert exhibits 
                                                 
32 Lloyd Dixon and Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases 
Since the Daubert Decision, xiii (2001) available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1439.pdf . 
33 Ibid, 61. 
34 Ibid, 28 (Figure 4-1). 
35 Ibid, 28 (Figure 4-1). 
36 Ibid, 28 (Figure 4-1). 
37 Ibid, 30 (Figure 4-2). 
38 Ibid, 50 (Figure 6-1). 
39 Ibid, 51 (Figure 6-2). 
objective indicators of quality.40  In terms of ultimate outcomes, although the RAND study finds 
that parties more frequently requested summary judgment on the basis of shortcomings in the 
other side’s expert evidence after the adoption of Daubert, the likelihood of such a request being 
granted was lower in every sample period post-Daubert than it was in the January 1980-June 
1989 period.41 
 
 Evidence of a Daubert effect at the state level is elusive as well.  In a research approach 
mirroring the RAND study, researchers from the National Center for State Courts examined a 
sample of products liability cases42 from the Delaware court system.43  Delaware adopted the 
Daubert trilogy in 1999.  The researchers found no difference pre and post Daubert adoption in 
terms of the likelihood of a motion to exclude an expert witness and in the likelihood of a 
summary judgment being entered,44 although these results must be viewed with caution since the 
sample only includes 57 cases.45  In addition to these case reviews, researchers from the National 
Center for State Courts interviewed attorneys and judges from Delaware.  Although these 
attorneys and judges claim that Delaware courts scrutinize experts more thoroughly post 
adoption,46 the researchers conclude that the impact of the Daubert trilogy has been minimal in 
Delaware courts.47 
 
In a more comprehensive study of Daubert’s effects at the state level, Cheng and Yoon 
employ a creative strategy whereby they examine the rate at which defendants request removal to 
federal court in tort cases as a function of whether the state in which the plaintiff files the case 
has adopted the Daubert standard.  For a preliminary analysis, they focus on the Eastern District 
of New York48 and the District of Connecticut.  Because Connecticut adopts Daubert in May of 
1997, Cheng and Yoon are able to exploit the two state comparison as a kind of natural 
experiment.49  Cheng and Yoon compare the removal rate in Connecticut before and after the 
adoption of Daubert.  Because the expert evidence rule does not change in New York, the 
removal rate in New York serves as a control or comparison group to net out any non-Daubert 
temporal effects in terms of changes in the incentive for defendants to seek removal during the 
post-May 1997 period.   
 
Effectively, if Daubert has an effect on the admissibility of expert evidence that is 
beneficial to defendants, on average, defendants will attempt to remove their cases to federal 
                                                 
40 Ibid, 72 (Table A-6). 
41 Ibid, 57 (Table 7-3). 
42 Specifically, the sample was drawn from Sussex, Kent, and New Castle counties. 
43 Nicole L. Waters and Jessica P. Hodge, The Effects of the Daubert Trilogy in Delaware Superior Court, 2005 
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/Res_Daubert_EffDaubDelawareSupCtFinal.pdf . 
44 Waters and Hodge, supra note __, 15. 
45 Waters and Hodge, supra note __, 14. 
46 Waters and Hodge, supra note __, 16-18.  
47 Waters and Hodge, supra note __, 21. 
48 New York retains the Frye rule throughout their sample period. 
49 Cheng and Yoon, supra note __, 485. 
court where Daubert is in force, unless the state of filing is also governed by the Daubert 
standard.  In the Cheng and Yoon framework, if they observe that removal rates for cases in 
Connecticut state courts decline after May 1997, and there is no contemporaneous decline in 
New York state court cases, it is plausible that Connecticut’s adoption of Daubert led to 
admissibility decisions that were more defendant friendly.  However, if no such change is 
observed, confidence in that hypothesis is diminished. 
 
Examining the period 1994-2000, they find that removal rates increase slightly in the 
Eastern District of New York after May 1997, while removal rates in Connecticut remain stable.  
While this is consistent with the hypothesis that Daubert changed admissibility standards in 
Connecticut, making those courts more defendant friendly, the effect is not statistically 
significant.50  That is, while it appears as though Daubert is associated with Connecticut not 
following the more general trend (observed in New York) toward more removal, the effect 
cannot be distinguished from ordinary random variation in the data. 
To expand their analysis, Cheng and Yoon examine data from 16 other state courts, eight 
of which adopt Daubert and eight of which do not, over the period 1994 to 2000.  Examining the 
same outcome, removal rates for tort cases, the authors attempt to discover whether the 
Connecticut experience was a more general phenomenon.  While they find a very small decline 
in the removal rate, on average, once states adopt Daubert, the effect amounts to a little more 
than one half of a percentage point and the effect is not statistically different from zero.51 
  
While the Cheng and Yoon research design is very persuasive, their identification 
strategy relies on the assumption that only the defendants’ decisions are affected by the change 
in evidence standards.  If a non trivial fraction of plaintiffs prefer the Daubert standard, the case 
mix between federal and state courts will be different before and after Daubert is adopted, 
causing problems for the natural experiment framework.  For example, if plaintiffs 
systematically prefer the Daubert standard and defendants hold no preference, we would expect 
to observe Cheng and Yoon’s results (i.e., no change in removal rates) as well, even though the 
implication would be very different than the conclusion they draw.  While such a scenario seems 
unlikely given conventional views of Daubert, the more general point remains.  Any deviation 
from the assumption that defendants prefer Daubert relative to plaintiffs limits the ability of 
Cheng and Yoon’s test to identify Daubert’s effect.   
 
Further, given the aggregate nature of their data, they are not able to observe any effect 
heterogeneity across different kinds of torts cases or across different kinds of experts.  For 
example, it could be the case that Daubert has a large effect in products liability cases alone but 
such a result might be interesting given the importance many commentators assign to products 
liability cases.  Because Cheng and Yoon cannot distinguish among torts cases, they would not 
                                                 
50 Cheng and Yoon, supra note __, 489. 
51 Cheng and Yoon, supra note __, 497. 
be able to detect such an effect because products liability cases make up a relatively small 
fraction of total torts cases.  Lastly, Cheng and Yoon are not able to examine whether the other 
parts of the Daubert trilogy have any effect given their sample. 
 
To confront these limitations of the Cheng and Yoon study, we adopt a complementary 
approach that uses a large scale dataset containing dispute specific information to examine the 
effect of state adoption of the Daubert trilogy.  Further, by focusing on the characteristics of the 
experts offered in these disputes, we avoid having to make assumptions about which side in a 
dispute is more likely to prefer a given evidence standard. 
 
4. Trial Data and Statistical Approach 
 
 We examine data from the Jury Verdict Research (JVR) Company which collects data on 
cases, both tried and settled, from state courts throughout the country.52  Although the JVR is not 
a random sample, the biases identified in the JVR do not appear to be related to case attributes 
that correlate with which expert witnesses are used.53  From the text file for each case in the 
database, we extracted information on the experts offered by both sides in the dispute.  Of 
interest for this study, the information includes the expert’s field of expertise and whether the 
expert includes a graduate or professional degree in his or her title.  We examine cases between 
1990 and 2003.  Table 2 provides the break-down of cases by year in our sample.  In total, we 
examine 9,125 cases that span every state with the distribution shown in Table 3. Given that the 
average case in our sample has 1.53 experts we have 14,048 expert-case observations. 
 
Table 2 
JVR Cases by Year 
1990 929 
1991 914 
1992 558 
1993 627 
1994 737 
1995 1,137 
1996 1,225 
1997 1,429 
1998 1,605 
1999 1,781 
2000 1,366 
2001 1,134 
2002 525 
2003 81 
 
                                                 
52 The JVR data are described in detail in Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick, and Alexander Tabarrok, Data Watch: Tort-
uring the Data, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 207, 213-214 (2005).  The data are available through the Westlaw database LRP-
JV. 
53 For a more complete discussion of the shortcomings in the JVR data, see Helland, Klick, and Tabarrok, supra note 
__, 214. 
Table 3 
JVR Cases by State 
State Cases 
Alaska  18 
Alabama  167 
Arkansas  222 
Arizona  27 
California  1721 
Colorado  31 
Connecticut  160 
Delaware  16 
Florida  938 
Georgia  157 
Hawaii  6 
Iowa  181 
Idaho  48 
Illinois  710 
Indiana  18 
Kansas  32 
Kentucky  27 
Louisiana  53 
Massachusetts  67 
Maryland  68 
Maine  17 
Michigan  109 
Minnesota  33 
Missouri  541 
Mississippi  10 
Montana  17 
North Carolina  250 
North Dakota  1* 
Nebraska  241 
New Hampshire  47 
New Jersey  43 
New Mexico  3 
Nevada  4 
New York  650 
Ohio  442 
Oklahoma  203 
Oregon  200 
Pennsylvania  209 
Rhode Island  13 
South Carolina  31 
South Dakota  5 
Tennessee  166 
Texas  494 
Utah  17 
Virginia  218 
Vermont  1* 
Washington  227 
Wisconsin  236 
West Virginia  10 
Wyoming  20 
*State eliminated from regressions due to only one case 
 
 We examine regressions analyzing the relationship between the likelihood that an expert 
from a given field54 is put forth in a case and whether the state where the case is filed has 
adopted Daubert, Joiner, and/or Kumho Tire, controlling for state and year fixed effects.55  The 
state fixed effects net out any state-to-state heterogeneity in the baseline use of various experts, 
while the year fixed effects capture any universal changes over time.  We also examine the 
likelihood that an expert has a Ph.D. or some other degree listed, in the same framework.  In 
addition to analyzing data from the full JVR sample, we examine case type specific data to 
determine whether there is any effect heterogeneity across different kinds of cases.  We estimate 
probit models, meaning that our dependent variable in each case takes the value of zero (i.e., 
expert not offered) or one (i.e., expert offered).  These models allow us to interpret the resulting 
coefficients as the change in probability associated with the adoption of a given evidence 
standard.56 We also include control variables for the severity of the injury (major, minor, death, 
and emotional injuries (without a physical injury)). In addition we include controls for the types 
of cases: sexual assault, sexual harassment, wrongful termination, premises liability, railroad 
liability, government liability, police liability, employer liability (excluding wrongful 
termination), medical malpractice, bad faith, auto case, product liability, aircraft liability and 
legal malpractice.  These case type controls allow us to account for differences in the baseline 
likelihood that a given expert is offered in a particular kind of case. 
 
 This kind of analysis has the potential to highlight important changes brought about by 
Daubert’s focus on methodological rigor.  For example, because methodological rigor is often 
stressed in fields where the terminal degree is a research doctorate (e.g., Ph.D.) as opposed to a 
taught degree (e.g., M.D.), if adoption of Daubert really leads to a focus on methodological 
rigor, we might expect to see a significant decline in the likelihood that a medical doctor is 
offered in a case as opposed to a toxicologist with a Ph.D. 
 
5. What Happens when States Adopt Daubert? 
 
 Before presenting the regression results, in Table 4, we provide the means and their 
associated standard errors for the likelihood that each kind of expert appears in cases in state by 
year cells where the Frye (or some other non-Daubert) standard is in force (columns i and ii) and 
where the Daubert standard applies (column iii).  Column ii restricts attention to only those 
states that eventually adopt Daubert.  That is, these are the means while Frye (or another non-
                                                 
54 We restrict attention to those fields for which a non-trivial number of experts appeared in the full JVR dataset. 
55 We do not examine cases in which no expert testifies. It is unclear if the absence of a listed expert in the JVR data 
reflects no expert testimony in the case or an omission in the reported case. In results not shown we find similar 
results when we estimate the models treating those cases without reported experts as having no expert testimony. 
56We present the marginal effects of each variable estimated at the sample mean.  Our results are robust to using a 
linear probability model or logit model. 
Daubert standard) governs in states that later switch to Daubert.  This column provides some 
insight as to whether those states that eventually adopt Daubert are somehow different than other 
states with respect to expert evidence, helping to flag any sample selection or endogeneity 
problems with treating any differences associated with adopting Daubert as being causally 
related to the use of the Daubert standard.    In general, these unconditional means provide some 
evidence about the differences generated by the adoption of Daubert and provides context for 
interpreting the regression results that follow. 
 
 
Table 4 
Mean Likelihood Expert from a Given Field Is Offered in a JVR Case 
All Case Types 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 All States Eventual Daubert States Only 
 Frye or Other Frye or Other Daubert 
 i ii iii 
Surgeon 0.22346 0.15007 0.21452 
 (0.00363) (0.00791) (0.01362) 
Psychiatrist 0.02321 0.01373 0.02200 
 (0.00131) (0.00258) (0.00487) 
Neurologist/Neurosurgeon 0.10084 0.05002 0.07921 
 (0.00263) (0.00483) (0.00896) 
Psychologist 0.05320 0.02452 0.03300 
 (0.00196) (0.00343) (0.00593) 
Medical Doctor 0.66824 0.49828 0.69857 
 (0.00418) (0.01108) (0.01523) 
Chiropractor 0.06553 0.04365 0.07811 
 (0.00216) (0.00453) (0.00891) 
Doctor of Osteopathy 0.32902 0.27612 0.34543 
 (0.00410) (0.00990) (0.01578) 
Podiatrist 0.00350 0.00098 0.00330 
 (0.00052) (0.00069) (0.00190) 
Nurse 0.00632 0.00294 0.00880 
 (0.00069) (0.00120) (0.00310) 
Dentist 0.01096 0.00785 0.00880 
 (0.00091) (0.00195) (0.00310) 
Epidemiologist 0.00464 0.00147 0.00770 
 (0.00059) (0.00085) (0.00290) 
Economist 0.03798 0.01520 0.02530 
 (0.00217) (0.00271) (0.00521) 
Accountant 0.00426 0.00343 0.00770 
 (0.00057) (0.00130) (0.00290) 
Vocational Expert 0.00274 0.00098 0.00110 
 (0.00046) (0.00069) (0.00110) 
Engineer 0.07421 0.03580 0.05611 
 (0.00229) (0.00412) (0.00764) 
Accident Reconstruction Expert 0.04087 0.02158 0.03080 
 (0.00173) (0.00322) (0.00573) 
Toxicologist 0.00556 0.00343 0.01100 
 (0.00065) (0.00130) (0.00346) 
Attorney 0.00396 0.00098 0.00330 
 (0.00055) (0.00069) (0.00190) 
 
 While there are no particularly remarkable findings in Table 4, especially relative to the 
underlying variation in the data, the specialties seem to fall roughly into three categories.  In each 
case, the likelihood of an expert of a given specialty being offered in a case is lower in states that 
eventually adopt Daubert during the pre-adoption period.  Once Daubert is adopted, the 
likelihood stays lower than non-Daubert states for: neurologists/neurosurgeons; psychologists; 
dentists; economists; vocational experts; engineers; and accident reconstruction experts.  Among 
those specialties where eventual Daubert states converge to the mean likelihood observed in 
non-Daubert states are: surgeons; psychiatrists; medical doctors; doctors of osteopathy; 
podiatrists; and attorneys.  Lastly, the specialties where the mean likelihoods observed in 
eventual Daubert states increase after adoption to exceed the likelihoods observed in non-
Daubert states are: chiropractors; nurses; epidemiologists; accountants; and toxicologists. 
 
 Similar (though not identical) patterns emerge when we examine the means separately for 
medical malpractice cases (Table 5), automobile cases (Table 6); products liability cases (Table 
7), and premises liability cases (Table 8).   
 
Table 5 
Mean Likelihood Expert from a Given Field Is Offered in a JVR Case 
Medical Malpractice Cases 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 All States Eventual Daubert States Only 
 Frye or Other Frye or Other Daubert 
 i ii iii 
Surgeon 0.28065 0.30918 0.30159 
 (0.00970) (0.03220) (0.04105) 
Psychiatrist 0.02424 0.00966 0.01587 
 (0.00332) (0.00682) (0.01118) 
Neurologist/Neurosurgeon 0.09091 0.03865 0.05556 
 (0.00621) (0.01343) (0.02049) 
Psychologist 0.03963 0.00966 0.02381 
 (0.00421) (0.00682) (0.01364) 
Medical Doctor 0.78695 0.67150 0.76984 
 (0.00884) (0.03272) (0.03765) 
Chiropractor 0.00699 0.00483 0.00000 
 (0.00180) (0.00483) (0.00000) 
Doctor of Osteopathy 0.42657 0.32850 0.38889 
 (0.01068) (0.03272) (0.04360) 
Podiatrist 0.00746 0.00000 0.00794 
 (0.00186) (0.00000) (0.00794) 
Nurse 0.03077 0.02415 0.06349 
 (0.00373) (0.01070) (0.02181) 
Dentist 0.01772 0.02899 0.03175 
 (0.00285) (0.01169) (0.01568) 
Epidemiologist 0.02098 0.00483 0.02381 
 (0.00310) (0.00483) (0.01364) 
Economist 0.04848 0.00966 0.04762 
 (0.00464) (0.00682) (0.01905) 
Accountant 0.00280 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00114) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Vocational Expert 0.00186 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00093) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Engineer 0.00280 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00114) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Accident Reconstruction Expert 0.00047 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00047) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Toxicologist 0.00466 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00147) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Attorney 0.00047 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00047) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
 
 
Table 6 
Mean Likelihood Expert from a Given Field Is Offered in a JVR Case 
Automobile Cases 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 All States Eventual Daubert States Only 
 Frye or Other Frye or Other Daubert 
 i ii iii 
Surgeon 0.22381 0.12927 0.21327 
 (0.00519) (0.00957) (0.01996) 
Psychiatrist 0.01273 0.00569 0.01185 
 (0.00140) (0.00215) (0.00527) 
Neurologist/Neurosurgeon 0.12013 0.05772 0.09242 
 (0.00405) (0.00665) (0.01411) 
Psychologist 0.03368 0.01545 0.00711 
 (0.00225) (0.00352) (0.00409) 
Medical Doctor 0.71256 0.50000 0.80332 
 (0.00564) (0.01426) (0.01937) 
Chiropractor 0.11718 0.06423 0.15166 
 (0.00401) (0.00699) (0.01748) 
Doctor of Osteopathy 0.34425 0.28780 0.42654 
 (0.00592) (0.01291) (0.02410) 
Podiatrist 0.00202 0.00163 0.00000 
 (0.00056) (0.00115) (0.00000) 
Nurse 0.00062 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00031) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Dentist 0.01086 0.00407 0.00474 
 (0.00129) (0.00181) (0.00335) 
Epidemiologist 0.00016 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00016) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Economist 0.01769 0.00569 0.00711 
 (0.00164) (0.00215) (0.00409) 
Accountant 0.00124 0.00081 0.00000 
 (0.00044) (0.00081) (0.00000) 
Vocational Expert 0.00062 0.00081 0.00000 
 (0.00031) (0.00081) (0.00000) 
Engineer 0.04842 0.01138 0.01659 
 (0.00267) (0.00303) (0.00622) 
Accident Reconstruction Expert 0.05634 0.02358 0.02844 
 (0.00287) (0.00433) (0.00810) 
Toxicologist 0.00466 0.00325 0.00474 
 (0.00085) (0.00162) (0.00335) 
Attorney 0.00016 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00016) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
   
 
 
Table 7 
Mean Likelihood Expert from a Given Field Is Offered in a JVR Case 
Products Liability Cases 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 All States Eventual Daubert States Only 
 Frye or Other Frye or Other Daubert 
 i ii iii 
Surgeon 0.10070 0.14815 0.10256 
 (0.01030) (0.03972) (0.02817) 
Psychiatrist 0.01639 0.01235 0.04274 
 (0.00435) (0.01235) (0.01878) 
Neurologist/Neurosurgeon 0.04918 0.08642 0.04274 
 (0.00740) (0.03141) (0.01878) 
Psychologist 0.06323 0.03704 0.02564 
 (0.00833) (0.02111) (0.01468) 
Medical Doctor 0.40749 0.41975 0.49573 
 (0.02083) (0.05518) (0.04642) 
Chiropractor 0.00468 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00234) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Doctor of Osteopathy 0.22014 0.22222 0.18803 
 (0.01419) (0.04648) (0.03628) 
Podiatrist 0.00351 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00203) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Nurse 0.00468 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00234) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Dentist 0.00820 0.01235 0.00000 
 (0.00309) (0.01235) (0.00000) 
Epidemiologist 0.01171 0.01235 0.00855 
 (0.00368) (0.01235) (0.00855) 
Economist 0.04215 0.02469 0.04274 
 (0.00688) (0.01735) (0.01878) 
Accountant 0.00468 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00234) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Vocational Expert 0.00234 0.00000 0.00855 
 (0.00166) (0.00000) (0.00855) 
Engineer 0.35363 0.32099 0.23932 
 (0.01637) (0.05220) (0.03961) 
Accident Reconstruction Expert 0.09133 0.07407 0.11966 
 (0.00986) (0.02928) (0.03013) 
Toxicologist 0.01054 0.00000 0.05983 
 (0.00350) (0.00000) (0.02202) 
Attorney 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Mean Likelihood Expert from a Given Field Is Offered in a JVR Case 
Premises Liability Cases 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 All States Eventual Daubert States Only 
 Frye or Other Frye or Other Daubert 
 i ii iii 
Surgeon 0.24663 0.14328 0.28966 
 (0.00899) (0.01917) (0.03780) 
Psychiatrist 0.02740 0.02388 0.02759 
 (0.00341) (0.00835) (0.01365) 
Neurologist/Neurosurgeon 0.08786 0.03284 0.13103 
 (0.00591) (0.00975) (0.02812) 
Psychologist 0.07960 0.04478 0.08276 
 (0.00565) (0.01132) (0.02296) 
Medical Doctor 0.61896 0.42090 0.63448 
 (0.01013) (0.02701) (0.04013) 
Chiropractor 0.02827 0.02687 0.04138 
 (0.00346) (0.00885) (0.01660) 
Doctor of Osteopathy 0.29404 0.22090 0.24828 
 (0.00950) (0.02270) (0.03600) 
Podiatrist 0.00565 0.00000 0.01379 
 (0.00156) (0.00000) (0.00972) 
Nurse 0.00130 0.00299 0.00000 
 (0.00075) (0.00299) (0.00000) 
Dentist 0.00870 0.00896 0.01379 
 (0.00194) (0.00515) (0.00972) 
Epidemiologist 0.00087 0.00299 0.00000 
 (0.00062) (0.00299) (0.00000) 
Economist 0.04828 0.03284 0.01379 
 (0.00639) (0.00975) (0.00972) 
Accountant 0.00913 0.01493 0.00000 
 (0.00198) (0.00663) (0.00000) 
Vocational Expert 0.00522 0.00299 0.00000 
 (0.00150) (0.00299) (0.00000) 
Engineer 0.09830 0.05970 0.07586 
 (0.00621) (0.01296) (0.02206) 
Accident Reconstruction Expert 0.02784 0.01194 0.00000 
 (0.00343) (0.00594) (0.00000) 
Toxicologist 0.00652 0.00597 0.00000 
 (0.00168) (0.00422) (0.00000) 
Attorney 0.00261 0.00299 0.01379 
 (0.00106) (0.00299) (0.00972) 
 
 While the results in Tables 4-8 are descriptively interesting primarily because they do not 
show any strong Daubert effect (at least relative to the underlying variation in the data), the 
implicit comparison could be misleading if there are general background trends in the data that 
are obscured by looking only at the unconditional means.  To control for these effects, we 
examine regressions that control for year fixed effects as well as idiosyncratic state fixed effects. 
 
 We first present regression results using the entire JVR sample in Table 9.  Each row 
represents a separate regression where we examine the likelihood that each kind of expert is 
offered in the case as a function of the adoption of the various parts of the Daubert trilogy, 
controlling for state and year fixed effects.  The coefficient in each column represents the change 
in likelihood that each kind of expert is offered associated with state adoption of each of the parts 
of the trilogy.57 
 
 While most of the coefficients cannot be distinguished from zero, we find a few 
potentially interesting associations.  For example, the likelihood of using a psychologist as an 
expert appears to decline with the adoption of Daubert, though much of this effect is undone 
once Kumho Tire is adopted.  A similar pattern is observed with economists and toxicologists. 
 
Table 9 
Effect of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire on Which Experts Are Offered 
(Standard Error Below in Parentheses) 
 Daubert Joiner Kumho Tire 
Surgeon 0.046* 
(0.027) 
-0.021 
(0.041) 
-0.036 
(0.030) 
Psychiatrist 0.007 
(0.012) 
0.038 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
Neurologist/Neurosurgeon 0.014 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.036) 
-0.002 
(0.026) 
Psychologist -0.023*** 
(0.009) 
N/A 0.019 
(0.025) 
Medical Doctor -0.006 
(0.030) 
0.021 
(0.055) 
-0.011 
(0.041) 
Chiropractor 0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
Doctor of Osteopathy -0.064** 
(0.025) 
0.051 
(0.054) 
-0.024 
(0.037) 
Podiatrist 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.995*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Nurse -0.001*** 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
0.013 
(0.030) 
Dentist 0.000 
(0.005) 
N/A 0.003 
(0.009) 
Epidemiologist -0.001 
(0.000) 
N/A 0.002 
(0.004) 
Economist -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
N/A 0.076** 
(0.038) 
Accountant -0.002 
(0.002) 
N/A 0.060 
(0.061) 
Vocational Expert -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
N/A 0.980*** 
(0.004) 
Engineer -0.000 
(0.011) 
N/A -0.016* 
(0.008) 
Accident Reconstruction Expert -0.004 
(0.005) 
N/A -0.006 
(0.005) 
                                                 
57 N/A signifies coefficients that we could not estimate given limitations in the data (i.e., too few observations where 
the given specialty was observed in states adopting the given standard).  
Toxicologist -0.004** 
(0.002) 
N/A 0.025 
(0.032) 
Attorney 0.001 
(0.002) 
N/A -0.000 
(0.000) 
Note:  Each row represents the marginal effects from a separate regression including state and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered by state to allow for dependence of observations across time.  Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 .  All p values are defined relative to the two sided 
hypothesis that the effect of adopting the given standard = 0. 
 
 In general, we find that the effects of each part of the Daubert trilogy are not all of the 
same sign for a given specialty.  Given this, it is useful to examine the net effect of adopting any 
part of the trilogy.  These results are presented in Table 10.  Again, although most of the effects 
are not distinguishable from zero, there are some exceptions.  Psychologists are less likely to be 
offered as experts if a state adopts some part of the trilogy, although this result may be an artifact 
of selection bias since it disappears if we restrict attention to only those states that eventually 
adopt Daubert.  Doctors of Osteopathy also appear to fare poorly once some part of the Daubert 
trilogy is adopted, and this result largely survives (though the effect is smaller in magnitude) if 
we restrict the sample. 
 
Table 10 
Net Effect of Adopting Any Part of Daubert Trilogy  
(Standard Error Below in Parentheses) 
 All States Eventual Daubert States Only 
Surgeon 0.023 
(0.022) 
0.009 
(0.025) 
Psychiatrist 0.016 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Neurologist/Neurosurgeon 0.014 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
Psychologist -0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Medical Doctor -0.072 
(0.130) 
-0.007 
(0.146) 
Chiropractor 0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.021) 
Doctor of Osteopathy -0.064*** 
(0.021) 
-0.037 
(0.030) 
Podiatrist 0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
Nurse 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.124 
(0.137) 
Dentist -0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.169** 
(0.066) 
Epidemiologist 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Economist 0.000 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
Accountant 0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Vocational Expert 0.000 
(0.005) 
0.957*** 
(0.034) 
Engineer -0.009 
(0.007) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
Accident Reconstruction Expert -0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
Toxicologist 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.022 
(0.033) 
Attorney 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Note:  Each row represents the marginal effects from a separate regression including state and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered by state to allow for dependence of observations across time.  Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 .  All p values are defined relative to the two sided 
hypothesis that the effect of adopting the given standard = 0. 
 
 To examine objective measures of the quality of experts offered, we also exploit the fact 
that the JVR includes information regarding whether the expert includes an indication of 
academic credentials in her title.  Given the limitations inherent in the JVR documentation, it is 
not possible to know how complete this information is, but there is no obvious reason why 
inclusion of this information should systematically vary with the evidence rules in a state, 
suggesting that no bias should arise due to incomplete information in this regard. 
 
 Given the focus of Daubert on methodological rigor, we might expect that adoption is 
associated with a higher likelihood of an expert having a Ph.D. since methodological training is 
generally a component of a Ph.D. program.  We find no systematic effect of state adoption of any 
part of the trilogy on the likelihood of the expert listing a Ph.D.  This is true whether we examine 
all of the states or just those that eventually adopt Daubert.  We find the same result when we 
look at the presence of any academic or professional degree in the expert’s title. 
 
 Because we have limited confidence in the completeness of the JVR’s inclusion of 
academic and professional degrees, we engaged in further data collection regarding the experts’ 
characteristics.  While it would be infeasible to track down the thousands of experts who appear 
in the JVR dataset, it is possible to put together this information for a subset of cases.  We focus 
on products liability cases given the special importance commentators have assigned Daubert in 
the products liability context.58 
 
 We attempted to collect the following information for all of the experts named in 
products liability suits in the JVR dataset: 1) Whether the expert’s graduate or professional 
training occurred at a top ten university as defined by US News and World Reports or the 
Gorman Report59; 2) Whether the expert has a university affiliation; 3) whether that affiliation is 
                                                 
58 See, for example, Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy, Daubert: The Most Influential Supreme 
Court Ruling You’ve Never Heard Of, 3 (2003) available at http://www.defendingscience.org/upload/Daubert-The-
Most-Influential-Supreme-Court-Decision-You-ve-Never-Heard-Of-2003.pdf  
59 US News and World Report began its rankings in 1983. For experts who received their degrees prior to 1983 we 
utilize the Gourman Report which began its rankings in 1967. For the handful of experts receiving degrees prior to 
1967 we use the ranks from the 1967. 
at a top ten university as defined by US News and World Reports; 4) years of experience in the 
field; and 5) whether the expert has any academic publications on her curriculum vitae.  While 
none of these pieces of information is a perfect proxy for an expert’s qualifications, each likely 
exhibits a positive correlation with quality.  We examine these outcomes in the same regression 
framework used above.  Items 1, 2, and 4 are analyzed as binary outcomes allowing us to 
interpret the resulting coefficients as the likelihood that there is an expert in the case exhibiting 
each criterion.  Years of experience are included as an integer outcome where the regression 
relates the adoption of the evidence standard to the years of experience the offered expert has.  
Each regression includes year and state fixed effects, and results are presented in Table 11 with 
each row representing a separate regression.   
 
Once again, we find relatively little by way of a systematic effect of Daubert, Joiner, and 
Kumho Tire on experts.  Daubert itself does appear to make it more likely that an expert has 
been educated at a top ten university, but its adoption is also associated with a lower likelihood 
that the expert is currently affiliated with a top ten university relative to the non-Daubert 
standards.  This may reflect a combination of an increasing need for methodological rigor as 
provided by the top graduate programs but a reduced reliance on prestigious affiliations as 
opposed to the quality of an expert’s work in terms of certifying herself as an expert.  Both of 
these results survive if we collapse the adoption variable into a single indicator of whether the 
state has adopted any part of the trilogy.  
 
Table 11 
Effect of Daubert Trilogy on Objective Quality of Experts in JVR Product Liability Cases 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Daubert Joiner Kumho Tire 
Top Ten  
Education 
 
1.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.288 
(0.353) 
-0.048 
(0.028) 
University 
Affiliation 
 
-0.043 
(0.170) 
-0.224 
(0.213) 
0.066 
(0.172) 
Top Ten  
Affiliation 
 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.992*** 
(0.003) 
0.070*** 
(0.019) 
Years of  
Experience 
 
1.257 
(5.387) 
4.848 
(8.897) 
1.225 
(4.942) 
Publication 0.067 
(0.162) 
0.013 
(0.262) 
-0.129 
(0.164) 
Note:  Each row represents the marginal effects from a separate regression including state and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered by state to allow for dependence of observations across time.  Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 .  All p values are defined relative to the two sided 
hypothesis that the effect of adopting the given standard = 0. 
   
6. Caveats 
 
 Empirical work with litigation-related data suffers from a number of problems, and this 
study is no different in this regard.  As pointed out in our review of litigation data with Tabarrok, 
existing civil litigation datasets are deeply flawed.60  With respect to the JVR data in particular, 
there is evidence that coverage of cases and settlements differs from area to area, and, most 
likely, this variation is not random.61  Although we have no reason to believe that inclusion of 
cases in the dataset is systematically related to state expert evidence rules, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that our results suffer from sample selection bias.  Another source of potential sample 
selection bias arises from which cases list the parties’ experts and which do not.  Because of the 
limited documentation regarding JVR’s data collection methods, we cannot be sure that our 
dataset captured all of the offered experts in the cases included in the JVR dataset.  Again, we 
have no prior indication that experts are missing in a non-random way that could bias our results, 
but the limited documentation precludes us from investigating this point more completely. 
 
 Another source of bias that might arise involves the fact that cases are not randomly 
distributed across states or across courts within a state.  Given this, using pre-Daubert cases 
within a state or contemporaneous cases in non-Daubert states as our counterfactual or control 
group may not be justified.  If these control cases are systematically different in terms of 
characteristics that also affect which experts are offered in a case, then the means and regressions 
we present above cannot be interpreted causally.  
 
 Further, even for our more detailed products liability, our quality proxies are very rough.  
For example, while it may be true that trilogy adoption has no effect on the likelihood the expert 
has published in an academic journal (as our results suggest), perhaps a better quality-adjusted 
publication measure would exhibit a systematic relationship with the adoption of Daubert. 
 
 Given these problems, it is appropriate to ask what value our results provide.  As 
described above, state adoption of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire has generated significant 
interest from academic commentators, legal professionals, and activists on both sides of the 
issue.  Empirical evidence is necessary to guide the debate and to craft optimal legal rules.  
Unfortunately, the relevant data are in short supply.  However, it is interesting that multiple 
research designs, including the Cheng and Yoon removal-focused strategy and the more 
exhaustive case study approaches of the National Center for State Courts and the RAND 
Corporation, all generate qualitatively similar conclusions.  Although each study is far from 
perfect, they are not duplicative in their shortcomings, so it is unlikely that they are all being 
driven by the same kind of bias.  Once this point is recognized, it becomes easier to place 
confidence in the weight of the evidence, even if no individual study provides a decisive answer 
regarding the effect of adopting Daubert in terms of how rigorously experts are scrutinized.     
 
                                                 
60 Helland, Klick, and Tabarrok, supra note __, 217-218. 
61 Ibid, 214. 
7. Conclusion 
 
 The Daubert trilogy creates a new standard for determining the admissibility of expert 
evidence in federal courts.  With its focus on methodological rigor, many tort reformers trumpet 
the Daubert standards as a way to get rid of junk science in the courtroom.  Conventional 
wisdom holds that Daubert led to stronger scrutiny of expert evidence in the federal courts, 
seemingly supporting the tort reformers’ view.  This has led to a related effort to encourage state 
courts to adopt the Daubert standard.  Despite all of these efforts, as well as the efforts of those 
opposing adoption on the grounds that Daubert is overly restrictive, there is virtually no 
systematic evidence supporting the view that adoption of Daubert makes any difference at all. 
 
 Because the existing evidence either focuses on the federal courts or a very limited range 
of state courts, we examine this issue using a large dataset that spans almost every state over a 
wide range of civil case types.  In this more comprehensive analysis, we too find very little 
evidence that adoption of the Daubert trilogy has any systematic effect on who is offered as an 
expert in state court disputes.  This is true even when we examine more detailed data in the area 
of products liability disputes where Daubert is thought to be particularly important.  While we 
cannot determine exactly why Daubert seems to have no systematic effect, our results are 
consistent with other empirical studies on this topic.  While none of these studies is perfect, their 
imperfections are largely orthogonal to each other, making it unlikely that design flaws or data 
limitations are driving this non-effect.  While courts may be scrutinizing expert evidence more 
carefully, as suggested by the RAND research at the federal level, it seems unlikely that this has 
anything to do with Daubert per se.    
